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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, same-sex schooling has gained renewed appeal
among educators, policymakers, and parents. This slow but steady
trend, especially among publicly supported schools, has generated
heated debate in academic, legal, and policy circles. Next to the funding
of school athletics, single-sex education is probably the most divisive
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issue in the modern-day quest for gender equality in education.' It has
proven especially troublesome to reconcile among women's advocates.
As this controversy has unfolded in the press and in the academic
literature, the most vocal and visible opposition has come from organ-
ized women's groups (although the American Civil Liberties Union also
has played a key role). And so one might easily point to "feminism" as
the primary enemy of single-sex schooling. That view, nevertheless, is
overly simplistic and misleading. First of all, it mistakenly implies that
feminism is both monolithic and static. It further suggests the negativity
that some now attach to the feminist label, as well as the more radical
oppositionist streams within feminism as a "movement."
This is not to ignore popular assertions that feminism itself is ir-
relevant or even "dead" or, in the least, has lost its compass. Certainly
life-style trends and attitudes seem to point in that direction. For many
young women in their twenties and thirties, secure in the power of edu-
cation to unlock professional doors, the "fires of feminism" seem to have
burned down at least initially to "the ashes of careerism, 2 and as recent
public debates suggest, ultimately to full-time motherhood by choice.'
Nevertheless, the term still retains vitality as an overarching set of prin-
ciples shared by those who are committed to advancing full political and
social equality for women. Despite differences in approaches that con-
tinue to evolve, those who come under this umbrella voice widespread
agreement on core issues that affect women nationally and globally-
equal educational opportunities, equal pay for equal work, adequate
child care, access to health care and disability benefits, preservation of
bodily integrity, freedom from violence. When pushed to a level of con-
sciousness, these concerns resonate even among young women, but
more strongly among women in their forties and fifties who came of age
at the height of feminist activism, although there are those who reject
the "feminist" designation per se.'
1. Except where the distinction between the two concepts is essential to the discussion, I
use sex (which technically refers to biological traits) and gender (referring to socially
constructed characteristics) interchangeably, as is often done in popular and scholarly
literature and in judicial opinions.
2. Rhonda Garelick, Career Girls, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2004, at A29.
3. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Oct. 26, 2003, at
42; Claudia Wallis, The Case for Staying Home, TIME, Mar. 22, 2004, at 51.
4. See ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, No TURNING BACK: THE HISTORY OF FEMINISM AND THE
FUTURE OF WOMEN (2002) (arguing that reports of feminism's demise are exagger-
ated and that traditions from around the world have permitted it to grow and
become stronger).
5. See Kate Dube, What Feminism Means to Today's Undergraduates, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., June 18, 2004, at B5.
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One issue on which feminists, whether broadly or narrowly de-
fined, do not agree, however, is single-sex schooling. Here the feminist
position is neither unified, nor is it clearly articulated in its full range.
While organized women's groups, who most visibly speak on behalf of
women, have voiced strong legal and political opposition to the concept,
numerous individuals-including dissenters within these same organiza-
tions-have supported it, most of them outside the public eye.
Noticeably absent from the debate are feminist legal scholars,
many, if not most of whom supported the Supreme Court's 1996 deci-
sion striking down the all-male admissions policy at the Virginia• 6 • 7
Military Institute. With rare exceptions, they have stood on the side-
lines of public discussion regarding its implications for elementary and
secondary education. That silence does not suggest that feminist think-
ing on this subject is unimportant. I believe that it simply reflects the
complexity of the underlying issues, the compelling arguments on behalf
of disadvantaged minority girls in particular, and the difficulties many
experience in arriving at a coherent position on single-sex schooling in
general. And although these disagreements and uncertainties within
feminism might seem to be merely of intellectual interest and directed
toward a narrow audience, they exemplify the deepest fears, hopes, and
passions of advocates, skeptics, and opponents. More importantly, the
feminist rift on this question ironically holds within it a wealth of
unique understandings that are crucial to making the connection be-
tween what is legally permissible and what is pedagogically sound.
6. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
7. See e.g., ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, SAME DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-
SEX SCHOOLING (2003) (arguing that public single-sex schooling is legal and may of-
fer academic and social benefits to some students); Denise C. Morgan, Anti-
Subordination Analysis after United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality
of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381 (proposing anti-
subordination theory to undergird public single-sex schools particularly for girls);
Susan Estrich, Sometimes, Single-Sex Schools Educate Best, DENVER POST, Sept. 24,
1996, at B07 (arguing that single-sex education should be an option to help urban
students develop their full potential). But see, Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: The
Educational Research and the Long-Term Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 451 (1999) (arguing that the historical and social significance of sex
segregation in American education mitigates against single-sex schooling); Valoric K
Vojdik, Girls' Schools After VMI" Do They Make the Grade? 4 DuKE J. GENDER L. &
PoL'y 69 (1997) (maintaining that arguments supporting single-sex schools rely on
the same gender stereotypes and generalizations that historically have excluded
women from public schooling and traditionally male professions); Deborah L.
Rhode, Single-Sex Schools Can Only Be Way Stations, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 18, 1997, at
Al 9 (maintaining that priority should be given to implementing more effective gen-
der equity policies in coeducational schools rather than establishing separate schools).
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In the discussion that follows, I examine this deep divide within
feminist ranks with an eye toward proposing a constructive and essential
role for feminist understandings as single-sex schooling inches its way
toward legal acceptability and into the mainstream of educational re-
form. In doing so, I examine the forces that have shaped competing
perspectives on women's equality, especially disagreements over same-
ness and difference. In the end I look to the Court's decision in United
States v. Virginia8 as a road map for feminists to follow in reaching
common ground on the approach, despite seemingly profound ideologi-
cal differences among them.
I. DECONSTRUCTING THE DEBATE
Single-sex education defies conventional political labels. It attracts
support from social and religious conservatives, including many African-
Americans, for its grounding in traditional values. It also engages the
attention of political conservatives for its implicit appeal to a free market
of parental choice and educational diversity. Among liberals, on the
other hand, the response has been far more mixed. In fact, the debate
over single-sex schooling has created some atypical alliances while breed-
ing strong animosity among traditional allies in the civil rights and
women's movements. Some have become ardent supporters of these
programs. For others, single-sex education programs evoke fear, sharp
criticism, and threats of legal action. Individuals, who in the past
marched together for women's rights, now find themselves, uncom-
fortably and sometimes stridently, facing off against each other in the
national press, in the broadcast media, and in scholarly journals. Still
others have remained quietly on the sidelines, ambivalent and reluctant
to align themselves with either camp.
A series of official actions with significant legal and policy
implications has intermittently given the debate political salience and
substance. In 1996, the Supreme Court handed down its ruling against
the Virginia Military Institute.9 That decision, addressing a unique
institution with a unique mission, has yet to be tested on elementary and
secondary programs. In January 2002, as part of the No Child Left
Behind Act, Congress authorized the use of federal funds for innovative
educational programs, including single-sex schools and classes.10 Yet
8. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
9. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
10. No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 1425, § 5131(a)(23)
(pending legislation amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 7215(a)(23) (2003)).
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several factors, including Title IX regulations dating from the 1970s, a
history of aggressive Office for Civil Rights enforcement under prior
administrations, and strong opposition from civil rights groups, have
made many school officials wary of using the funds for these purposes
without further clarification from the Department of Education."
That clarification seemed to be near at hand in May 2002, when
the Department announced that it was reviewing the regulations to al-
low more flexibility, and presumably to bring them into compliance
with the Court's decision in Virginia and with the Tide IX statute.
12
The Department subsequently received more than 170 responses to a
series of questions posed in that announcement. Women's and civil
rights organizations were the primary opponents of any changes in the
regulations, while support came largely from school districts and charter
school organizers." Further word from Washington did not come until
March, 2004, when the Department issued proposed regulations offer-
ing school districts considerable flexibility in establishing schools and
11. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq. states that
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance;" see also Nondis-
crimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. 5 106.1 et seq. (2004).
12. U.S. Department of Education, Notice of Intent-Nondiscrimination on the Basis
of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 67
Fed. Reg. 31,098 (May 8, 2002).
13. Groups opposing any changes in the Title IX regulations included the National Or-
ganization for Women, the NOW Legal Defense Fund, the National Women's Law
Center, the American Association of University Women, the Women's Research and
Education Institute, the Feminist Majority Foundation, the California Women's Law
Center, the National Council of Women's Organizations, the National Council for
Women and Girls in Education, the Business and Professional Women USA, the Asso-
ciation for Gender Equity Leadership in Education, the Clearinghouse on Women's
Rights, the Florida Women's Consortium, the American Civil Liberties Union, the
New York Civil Liberties Union, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the Citi-
zen's Commission on Civil Rights, the National PTA, and the National Education
Association. Those supporting changes included the Young Women's Leadership
School of Chicago, the Chicago Board of Education, the Detroit Board of Education,
the Brighter Choice Foundation, the Toussaint Institute, Victory Schools, the Empire
Foundation for Policy Research, the New York Charter Schools Association, the Center
for Education Reform, the International Boys' Schools Coalition, the National Coali-
tion of Girls' Schools, the National Association for Single-Sex Public Education, the
Teamsters National Black Caucus, and the United Jewish Organizations. Letters sub-
mitted to the Department of Education in response to the Notice of Intent (May 8,
2002) (on file with author).
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classes that separate students on the basis of sex. 4 It remains to be seen
how well these proposals survive the intense scrutiny of the prescribed
forty-five day period for public comment before they become finalized.
The very fact that a year and a half passed between the initial an-
nouncement and publication of the proposed regulations, and another
seven months have elapsed since the comment period closed, speaks
volumes to the complexity and political sensitivity of the critical issues
presented and the sharp disagreements over how to resolve them.
At first glance, it may appear rather odd that a seemingly benign
approach, especially one traditionally favored among privileged classes,
should provoke such visceral reactions from across the political spec-
trum. These disparate responses, however, are merely symptomatic of
deeper disagreements rooted in history and tradition and born of
women's struggle for equal access to education. For countries such as the
United States, the separation of girls and boys confronts, head-on, the
canon of coeducation and lifts its longstanding veneer of gender neutral-
ity. 1 5 In doing so, it opens wide the very concept of equality as applied
to sex and stirs up sharp differences over the relationship between sex on
the one hand and aptitude, attitude, and achievement on the other.
A. A Confluence of Forces
The fragmented feminist response to the question of single-sex
schooling is due in no small measure to the paradoxes and dilemmas
inherent in the concept itself. But to fully grasp that picture, we must
first consider the historical, social, and educational developments that
have shaped the debate. To begin that discussion, let me take you back
to the summer of 1996 when, within weeks of each other, two interre-
lated news stories captured the media's attention-one obviously
national and the other seemingly more local to New York City.
14. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276 (2004) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R.
pt. 106) (stating the Department of Education's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
15. By 1900, only 12 out of 628 cities reported that they operated any single-sex high
schools. U.S. COMM'R OF EDuc. REPORT FOR 1900-1901, at 1221, cited in DAVID
TYACK & ELIZABETH HANSOT, LEARNING TOGETHER: A HISTORY OF COEDUCATION
IN AMERICAN PUBLc SCHOOLS 114 (1990); see also Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle
and Practice of Women s "Full Citizenship " A Case Study of Sex-Segregated Public Edu-
cation, 101 MICH. L. REv. 755, 792-808 (2002) (demonstrating how the historical
record reveals that not only single-sex education but also coeducation has denied
women "full citizenship").
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In late June of that year, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its
long-awaited decision in the case against the Virginia Military Insti-
tute. 16 Here, seven justices agreed that the categorical exclusion of
women from the all-male institution violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."7 They further rejected the remedy that
the state of Virginia offered: a separate program, the Virginia Women's
Institute for Leadership (VWIL), at the privately-supported all-female
Mary Baldwin College. In a sweeping opinion on the constitutional di-
mensions of gender equality, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, speaking for
the Court, set to rest not only the claims brought on behalf of women
against VMI, but also similar litigation against the Citadel in South
Carolina. 8 In fact, it was the drama surrounding the heroic efforts of
Shannon Faulkner, a young woman who tried to gain entry into the
Citadel's corps of cadets, that set the real-world backdrop for sorting
through the complex legal and policy issues presented in the VMI litiga-
tion. 9 The hair-raising story of the hostility and abuse cast upon her as
her case wound its way through the federal courts surely must have
haunted the justices as they handed down one of the Court's most tex-
tured statements on sex discrimination and women's equality.
The complexity and intensity of Justice Ginsburg's opinion and the
firmness with which she spoke for her colleagues reverberated through-
out the feminist world. While many women's advocates rejoiced in the
immediate decision, many also feared that it might sound the death
knell for all publicly supported single-sex programs or jeopardize gov-
ernment funding for the myriad private women's colleges. Justice Scalia,
in dissent, sternly warned of that possibility although history has proven
him wrong.20 As this discussion swirled through academic and legal cir-
cles, the New York press reported that a local school district in New York
City was planning to open an all-girls' middle school in East Harlem.2'
The seeming incongruity of these two public acts immediately touched
off a debate that slowly but steadily gained national proportions.
16. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states as follows: "No Stare shall ... deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
18. Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cit. 1995).
19. See CATHERINE S. MANEGOLD, IN GLORY'S SHADOW: SHANNON FAULKNER, THE
CITADEL AND A CHANGING AMERICA (2000); see also LAURA FAIRCHILD BRODIE,
BREAKING OUT: VMI AND THE COMING OF WOMEN (2000).
20. Virginia, 518 U.S at 596-600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. Anemona Hartocollis, A Public Schoolfor Girls Only, DAILY NEws, July 15, 1996, at
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As the forces began lining up on either side, it soon became
apparent that something unusual and somewhat incomprehensible was
happening within the ranks of women's advocates. Some who had
passionately denounced all-male admissions at state military academies
like VMI and the Citadel were suddenly rallying to support a public
single-sex school for inner-city girls in the name of affirmative action.
Others, despite their avid support for affirmative action, were
condemning the school with equal resolve. The fragile women's
consensus seemed to be unraveling at the seams. It was clear that the
question of single-sex schooling, while significant in itself, was also a
flashpoint for more fundamental disagreements over gender equality as a
legal standard, a moral principle, and a policy objective.
B. Competing Arguments
Few issues have caused such sharp divisions in the dwindling ranks
of scholars, advocates, and public intellectuals who still proudly carry
the "feminist" banner or who, at the least, believe that women have yet
to win the battle for equal citizenship. For more than a decade, the Na-
tional Organization for Women and the American Civil Liberties Union
have swiftly moved to stop school districts dead in their tracks at the
mere suggestion of separating females and males. From Detroit and
Milwaukee to Philadelphia, New York, and Chicago, local chapters of
these organizations have either threatened or undertaken some form of
legal action with mixed success. Yet not all their members have agreed
with these organizational positions or with their underlying assump-
tions. In fact, I would venture to guess that NOW's membership, in
particular, has dwindled over this precise issue.
The same internal conflict holds true for the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund. In the early 1990s, the leadership of both
organizations officially opposed plans to establish all-male Afrocentric
academies in Detroit and Milwaukee. The rationale was that these
programs would reinforce the pervasive isolation of African-American
males, whom school officials too readily placed in special education classes
or in schools for students with disciplinary problems.22 At its annual
convention in Houston in 1991, the NAACP adopted a policy
22. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, REFLECTIONS ON PROPOSALS FOR
SEPARATE SCHOOLS FOR AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALE PUPILS 9 (1990).
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reaffirming its "historical opposition to school segregation of any kind."
23
Yet Detroit delegates to the convention opposed the resolution. The
executive director of the Detroit branch best captured their thinking,
noting how all-male schools were "a level of redress and response to
discrimination." 24 The Coalition of 100 Black Men has echoed a similar
view, rallying to support the Eagle Academy for Men, an all-boys' public
high school recently opened in New York City.25 The Coalition of 100
Black Women likewise has supported New York's Young Women's
Leadership School where many of the group's members serve as mentors.
Meanwhile, African-American educators and parents nationwide
have become ardent supporters of single-sex programs for at-risk students.
The increasing number of inner-city programs that continue to spring up
around the country are a testament to that fact. Between 2000 and
2003, fifteen public single-sex schools opened their doors, either as new
ventures or as reconstituted formerly coeducational schools. In all but
three of them, the student population is over 85 percent non-white.26
An additional ten schools were slated to open in Fall 2004 in New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas.
Supporters call the opposition to single-sex education misguided
and ideological. Opponents rail against the other side's naivete. Each
side claims the high road on gender and justice. Proponents argue that
single-sex programs are necessary, at least under some circumstances, to
promote equality of opportunity. For them, sometimes "different"
means "equal." They typically offer both short- and long-term rationales
focused primarily on girls: improving overall academic achievement;
developing interest and competency in math, science, and technology;
improving self-esteem; and increasing interest in and opening access to
male-dominated careers. Many further maintain that separate programs
remove the distraction of the other sex and place the intellectual above
the social particularly for adolescents.
23. NATIONAL Assoc. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, NAACP RESOLU-
TIONS ON EDUCATION, 1970-1991, at 5 (1993).
24. Ron Russell, Legal Arm of NAACP Threatens to Join Lawsuit Blocking All-Male
Schools, THE DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 21, 1991, at 1A.
25. Lynda Richardson, For Principal. New Boys' School is a Call to Action, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2004, at B4.
26. Single-Sex Schools, chart prepared for Single-Sex Schools: Expert Panel Meeting, study
on Single-Sex Schools: Their Characteristics and Effects, U.S. Department of Education,
Jan. 15, 2004 (on File with author).
27. Ron Heflin, More States Offer Single-Sex Schools, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2004, availahle
at http://www.usaroday.com/news/nation/2004-08-24-single-sex-schools-x.htm.
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6 LAW
Some suggest that beneath coeducation lies a "hidden curricu-
lum"-a subtle, but nonetheless harmful, institutionalized program of
male dominance in classroom interactions, uneven teacher expectations,
and attitudes that prepare students for gender-specific roles in society.
Others contend that coeducation fails to adequately recognize the range
of learning styles and emotional needs that both girls and boys bring to
school, and the different paces at which they mature and develop skills.
Single-sex programs, they argue, give girls an emotional space in which
to develop leadership and intellectual abilities free from the pressure of
boys. Still others maintain that single-sex programs can prove especially
effective for disadvantaged minority students, including inner-city boys
as well as girls." Many supporters, although certainly not all, are women
who attended academically rigorous single-sex schools or colleges, which
proved for them a positive, and even defining, experience. Undoubtedly,
their personal familiarity with the approach eases some of the serious
concerns that classifications based on sex typically evoke within the
ranks of women's advocates.
Opponents, on the other hand, look to equal treatment and argue
that single-sex programs undermine equality. The most absolutist
among them draw on the Court's decision in the case against VMI and
the "skeptical scrutiny" applied there.2 9 They further rely on Brown v.
Board of Education)0 For them, "separate educational facilities are inher-
ently unequal," whether the qualifying factor is race or sex. In their
28. See generally, PAT MAHONEY, SCHOOL FOR THE Boys: COEDUCATION REASSESSED
(1985); Cornelius Riordan, What Do We Know about the Effects of Single-Sex Schools
in the Private Sector? Implicationsfir Public Schools, in GENDER IN POLICY AND PRAC-
TICE: PERSPECTIVES IN SINGLE-SEX AND COEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLING 10 (Amanda
Datnow & Lea Hubbard eds., 2002) [hereinafter GENDER IN POLICY AND PRACTICE];
Rosemary C. Salomone, The Legality of Single-Sex Education in the United Stated:
Sometimes "Equal" Means "Different," in GENDER IN POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra, at
47; SALOMONE, supra note 7; Elizabeth Sarah er al., The Education of Feminists: The
Case for Single-Sex Schools, in LEARNING TO LOSE: SEXISM AND EDUCATION (Dale
Spender & Elizabeth Sarah eds., 1980); Jennifer Shaw, Education and the Individual:
Schooling for Girls, or Mixed Schooling-A Mixed Blessing?, in SCHOOLING FOR
WOMEN'S WORK 66 (Rosemary Deem ed., 1980); JANICE STREITMATrER, FOR GiLS
ONLY: MAKING A CASE FOR SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING (1999); Morgan, supra note 7;
Cornelius Riordan, Single-Gender Schools: Outcomes for African and Hispanic Ameri-
cans, 10 RES. IN SOC. OF EDUC. AND SOCIALIZATION 177 (1994); Estrich, supra note
7; Judy Mann, Boys and Girls Apart: Single-Sex Education Is One School Choice We
Need, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1996, at C01; William Raspberry, Male Teachersfrr In-
ner-City Boys, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1987, at Al 1; Diane Ravitch, Things Go Better in
Single-Sex Schools, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 1995, at A23; Karen Stabiner, Separate and
Better: Single-Sex Ed, NEWSDAY, May 14, 2002, at A27.
29. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531.
30. 347 U.S. 484 (1954).
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view, separation is a euphemism for worse; it represents subordination
and inferiority, it perpetuates harmful stereotypes, and in the case of
single-sex programs, it stigmatizes girls. Others take a more moderate
position. The problem is not separateness per se, but rather unequal
treatment. What is offered to one sex must be offered to the other. Still
others maintain that the two programs need not be identical, but rather
show "substantial equity," invoking the standard that Justice Ginsburg
applied in her opinion in Virginia.3' And finally, there are those who
look to history and social consequences, basing their rationales either on
sex or on economics. Here programs are acceptable where they serve
girls but not boys, or where they address the needs of disadvantaged
students but not the more privileged.
Those who align themselves on this side of the debate present pas-
sionate policy arguments to support their position. They contend that
single-sex programs smack of benevolent sexism and deny young women
and men the interpersonal skills they need to relate to each other now
and in the future. They argue that separation does not breed the mutual
understanding and respect that place women on an equal footing with
men. They see single-sex education, at best, as a short-term fix that ig-
nores the more pervasive gender inequities that continue to distort the
schooling experience, especially for girls. At worst, they believe that it
may reinforce persistent gender stereotypes."
C Historical Exclusion
On close examination, these arguments reveal concerns grounded
in not-too-distant history. Opponents fear the return to a world that
confronted the modern-day women's movement in the 1960s, a world
31. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 554.
32. See generally, Patricia B. Campbell & Jo Sanders, Separating Equals: The Educational
Research and the Long-Term Consequences of Sex Segregation, in GENDER IN POLICY
AND PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 31; Janice Weinman, Comment to Rosemary C.
Salomone, Single-Sex Schooling: Law, Policy, and Research, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
EDUCATION POLICY 1999, at 288 (Diane Ravitch ed., 1999); Levit, supra note 7; Vo-
jdik, supra note 7; Anne Conners & Norman Seigel, A School for Girls Only? No,
That's Sex Discrimination, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Nov. 11, 1997, at 63; Ellen Goodman,
Back to Single-Sex Schools? BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 2002, at A17; Wendy Kaminer,
The Trouble with Single-Sex Schools, ATILANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1998, at 22; Peggy
Orenstein, All-Girls Schools Duck the Issue, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1996, at A19;
Rhode, supra note 7; Margaret Talbot, Sexed Ed, N.Y. TIMES (MAGAZINE), Sept. 22,
2002, at 17; Leslie R. Wolfe, Don't Segregate Gir, USA TODAY, Apr. 25, 1996, at
12A.
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6r LAW
where gender-segregated schools and vocational classes denied girls
educational resources, limited their employment options to a finite set
of low-paying jobs-hairdressing, dress-making, nursing, secretarial
work-and foreclosed them from certain areas of knowledge, most
notably and notoriously, science and mathematics." They painfully
recall the historical exclusion of women from elite academic institutions,
both at the university level and among private and public secondary
schools. It is only several decades since most of these institutions became
coeducational. Some, like the University of Virginia and Central High
School in Philadelphia, acted under court mandate.34 Some fell directly
under the sword of Title IX. But these and others, like Harvard, Yale,
and numerous private secondary schools, also responded to a
combination of social pressure and market forces. In the midst of a
sexual revolution, both female and male students became less inclined to
choose same-sex schooling. Meanwhile, both female and male
institutions realized that they could improve the academic quality of
their applicant pool by including the other fifty percent of the
population.
Women's advocates remember all too well the Philadelphia litiga-
tion where it became apparent that Girls' High School was receiving
significantly fewer resources than the all-boys Central High: half the
number of library books, half the number of computers, and one-fifth
the number of courses for the "mentally gifted;" not to mention Cen-
tral's superior facility, better educated faculty, and prestigious alumni
network.35 Nor can they easily forget how girls in Boston had to meet
higher standards to fill half the number of seats at Girls' Latin High
School as compared with applicants at the esteemed Boys' Latin High
School.36 The memories of these experiences are still too vivid for some
to feel any comfort with sex-based admissions for any reason. They fear
the potential danger for backsliding.
D. Sex, Race, and Academic Performance
Threaded through the discussion on single-sex schooling is the
well-publicized research on how coeducation has failed girls, along with
33. See KAREN GRAvEs, GIRLS' SCHOOLING DURING THE PROGRESSlVB ERA: FROM
FEMALE SCHOLAR TO DOMESTICATED CITIZEN xviii (1998).
34. Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va.
1970); Newburg v. Bd. of Educ., 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 682 (Phil. Cry. 1983).
35. Newburg, 26 Pa. D. &. C.3d at 703-04.
36. Bray v. Lee, 337 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1972).
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more recent studies sounding an equally troubling alarm with regard to
boys. Related to these concerns is the issue of sex as it intersects with
race, culture, and social class. Here we see the almost intractable
problems that surround the education of minority girls and boys,
especially in urban communities.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, findings not only from the
United States, but also from other developed countries, warned that
girls were underachieving, particularly in math and science.3 7 Research-
ers offered various causes: girls were losing their self-esteem as they
approached adolescence, teachers were giving more classroom attention
and validation to boys, boys were dominating the linguistic space of the
classroom and denying girls an equal opportunity to participate." To-
gether, these reports painted a painful portrait of growing up female in
America.
More recent findings on boys have created a backlash against the
damaging, and somewhat misleading, implications of both the "deficit"
and the "girls as victims/boys as villains" positions. A wave of popular
literature now suggests that boys are not faring as well, both emotionally
and academically, as generally believed. There is growing recognition
that coeducational schools are not the totalistic bastions of male privi-
lege that the gender equity project has assumed. Some maintain that the
structural and behavioral expectations of most coeducational schools,
particularly elementary schools, actually tend to favor girls "since teach-
ers have become 'well-sensitized to [their] voices.' , Others argue that
the myth that schools shortchange girls is dangerously wrong because it
diverts attention from African-American boys and their serious educa-
tional and social deficits as compared with African-American girls.
37. See, e.g., GENDER AND MATHEMATICS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 87-118
(Leone Burton ed., 1990); MATHEMATICS AND GENDER 10-26 (Elizabeth Fennema
& Gilah C. Leder eds., 1990); UNESCO, THE SCIENTIFIC EDUCATION OF GIRLS
(1995).
38. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION,
THE AAUW REPORT: How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GRLS (1992); ROSEMARY
DEEM, WOMEN AND SCHOOLING (1978); GENDER INFLUENCES IN CLASSROOM IN-
TERACTION (Louise Cherry Wilkinson & Cora B. Marrett eds., 1985); MYRA SADKER
& DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS (1994).
39. WILLIAM POLLACK, REAL Boys: RESCUING OUR SONS FROM THE MYTHS OF Boy-
HOOD 239 (1998); see also SALOMONE supra note 7, at 81 (1996); MICHAEL GURIAN,
THE WONDER OF Boys (1997); DAN KINDLON & MICHAEL THOMPSON, RAISING
CAIN: PROTECTING THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF Boys (1999).
40. See Judith Kleinfeld, Women's Freedom Network Working Paper No. 2, The Myth
That Schools Shortchange Girls: Social Science in the Service of Deception (May 26,
1998), available at http://www.womensfreedom.org/wp2.pdf.
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While most of these arguments are well-reasoned, politically balanced,
and informative, others are filled with invective, casting blame on radi-
cal feminism for this apparent war on boys."
The truth is that schools are shortchanging both girls and boys, but
in different ways. Girls are surpassing boys on many measures of
academic success, including college attendance; meanwhile the gender
gap favoring boys in math and science has narrowed. This is not to
suggest, however, that girls' achievement no longer merits concern and
attention. Girls continue to lag behind boys, especially on high-stakes
tests like the SAT and Advanced Placement exams, as well as on entrance
exams to medical and law schools. Boys outperform girls on all areas of
the Advanced Placement examinations with the exception of art history
and foreign languages. That is the case even in biology and English
language and composition, where girls typically outperform boys in
classroom work. Despite impressive gains in school performance, girls still
have trouble penetrating a glass ceiling at the highest levels of academic
achievement, especially in math, science, and technology.
Since 1995, for example, the proportion of girls taking the
Advanced Placement computer science A exam has declined, while the
gender gap in average scores has widened. At the same time, however,
far more girls than boys take Advanced Placement exams in art history,
foreign languages, and English language and composition. These
discrepancies reflect a gender-polarized course selection that runs more
pervasively throughout the curriculum. Some of these achievement
disparities, admittedly, are due to the larger number of low-performing
girls applying to college and, consequently, taking SAT and Advanced
Placement exams. But that fact does not explain the lingering gender
gap in math and science on more inclusive standardized tests such as the
National Assessment of Educational Progress, which includes a cross-
section of students nationwide.
Nevertheless, while there are fewer girls at the top of the achieve-
ment ladder, there are far more boys at the bottom. Boys as a group
have fallen even further behind girls in reading and verbal skills. They
also demonstrate a much higher incidence of learning disabilities and
other disorders, including autism and attention deficit disorder, al-
though there is growing evidence that girls may suffer similar problems
41. See, e.g., MICHAEL GuRIuN, A FINE YOUNG MAN (1998); Gu~iAN, supra note 39;
CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE WAR AGAINST Boys: How MISGUIDED FEMINISM
is HARMING OUR YOUNG MEN (2000).
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that go unidentified because of their compliant classroom behavior.
Girls simply know how to play school.42
Some of the persistent sex differences in school performance may,
in fact, be a function of the more resistant academic and social problems
that characterize poor and disadvantaged boys. Many African-American
boys, in particular, live within a subculture that fails to foster the
academic identification necessary for educational achievement. They
gain their self-esteem from sports and social popularity at the expense of
intellectual pursuits. 3 Within this population, suspension and dropout
rates and the incidence of criminal activity have reached alarming
proportions. More than two-thirds of African-American fourth graders
are functionally illiterate, and most of them are boys. African-American
students are three to five times more likely than white students to be
suspended or expelled from school, and again, most of these are boys.
There are now more African-American males in prison than in college.4
Yet that is not to negate the problems facing disadvantaged minor-
ity girls. While many among them appreciate the value of education and
express lofty goals, overwhelming personal and social circumstances fre-
quently derail their plans. Teen motherhood and marginal employment,
too often, become their foreseeable fate, relegating them and their chil-
dren into an unending cycle of poverty. 5 School district officials and
charter school organizers nationwide are increasingly turning to single-
sex schooling to address these troubling realities.
E. The Sameness-Difference Dilemma
Implicit in the boy-girl debate is the belief that girls and boys
interact with the educational environment in different ways. Of course,
the inevitable and highly controversial question is, "Why?" Is it a matter
of sex-based differences, and if so, are these differences biologically
42. SALOMONE, supra note 7, at 86-92 (discussing the data on gender and academic
achievement); see generally, WARREN W. WILLINGHAM & NANCY S. COLE, GENDER
AND FAIR ASSESSMENT (1997).
43. See generally, JOHN OGBU & ASTRID DAVIs, BLACK AMERICAN STUDENTS IN AN AFFLU-
ENT SUBURB: A STUDY OF ACADEMIC DISENGAGEMENT (2003); Jason W. Osborne, Race
andAcademic Disidentification, 89 J. EDUc. PsYcH. 728 (1997); Claude M. Steele, Race
and the Schooling of Black Americans, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1992, at 68.
44. SALOMONE, supra note 7, at 109-10 (discussing academic and social problems among
inner-city African-American boys).
45. Id. at 108 (discussing academic and social problems among disadvantaged minority
girls).
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determined (and therefore inevitable) or culturally constituted (and thus
avoidable)? Or is it some combination of the two? In any case, are they
changeable?
Until recent years, feminists and others strongly resisted research
on sex differences, believing that the question itself was unscientific,
politically motivated, and ultimately harmful to women's social equality.
That position is beginning to change. Although arguments based in
brain research still understandably give rise to serious concerns for their
potentially dangerous misuse and misleading implications, new
statistical techniques and technology have made research findings in this
area generally more reliable.
There now seems to be some consensus, even among women's ad-
vocates, that individuals are shaped both by nature and nurture. The
relative influence of each factor is a matter of genetics interacting with
the range of experiences over the course of the individual's life.46 Home
and school tend to reinforce whatever initial biological differences may
exist by providing children, from an early age, with activities and experi-
ences suitable to their perceived and group-defined talents. At the same
time, research has proven that many of these initial differences are
highly manipulable and some of them significantly so.' For example,
the intense attention afforded girls' performance in math over the past
two decades has narrowed significantly the achievement gap favoring
boys, despite previous developmental lags in visual-spatial ability among
girls as a group. That striking result could be interpreted as a case of
education overcoming biology. Of course, it could also be a matter of
education overcoming early socialization, or a combination of the two.
The scientific literature on this topic is far too vast, the findings too
tentative, and the implications for single-sex education too uncertain for
purposes of this discussion. Nevertheless, the issue of sex differences
gives rise to a host of significant questions. Are girls and boys different
in some relevant characteristics or factors that require a different ap-
proach to their education? Should they be separated for at least a part of
their schooling to accommodate possible sex-based differences in learn-
ing styles, attitudes, abilities, or developmental pace? Does even the
suggestion of innate differences imply a deficit on the part of one or the
other sex? Does it erroneously involve an essentialist or monolithic con-
cept of womanhood that transcends race, culture, and social class? Can
46. JOANN DEK WITH TERESA BARKER, Gi.I-s WILL BE GIRLS: RAISING CONFIDENT
AND COMPETENT DAUGHTERS 114 (2002).
47. See ELEANOR EMMONS MACCOBY AND CAROL NAGY JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX
DIFFERENCES 94 (1974). See also, ELEANOR E. MACCOBY, THE Two SEXES: GROWING
UP APART, COMING TOGETHER 116-17 (1998).
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sex separation be justified, at least partially, in relation to these factors as
they separately and collectively influence academic success? As these
questions continue to loop through the debate, they have generated an
intricate web of contrasting arguments, directly or indirectly rooted in
feminist scholarship of recent decades.
II. DVERSE VOICES WITHIN FEMINISM
Within feminist ranks, ideological disagreements over sameness and
difference and what it means for women to achieve political and social
equality inevitably arise, directly or indirectly, in the discussion of sin-
gle-sex education. The key voices in the sameness-difference debate have
followed one of several strategies largely associated with "second wave"
(post 1950s) feminism: to deny the existence of any relevant differences
between women and men; to recognize and even celebrate them; or, to
discard them by totally redefining the terms for addressing relations be-
tween the sexes. Within these competing approaches, the concepts of
sameness, difference, dominance, and (in)essentialism together provide a
theoretical framework and language for examining the question of
whether single-sex programs advance or undermine equality among dif-
ferent populations of females as well as males.
A. Liberal Feminism
Among the most vocal critics of single-sex schooling, as typified
again by the National Organization for Women, much of their thinking
flows out of feminist advocacy from the 1970s. Feminists of that era
struggled to stamp out the remains of a centuries-old "separate spheres"
mythology, dating as far back as the ancient Greeks. Their views were
based on an assimilationist model that called for fairness as equal treat-
ment based on a male norm. Their strategy was to prove that women
were the same as men on whatever the relevant criterion happened to
be.
Seeking to move women into the public sphere, they defined their
goals by what was valued and possessed by white, middle-class men:
public respect and recognition, gratifying careers with the attendant
monetary rewards and status, and freedom from the rigid social
expectation of bearing and raising children. By focusing on equal rights,
they could avoid the complicated and politically sensitive issue of
whether differences between the two sexes were biological or cultural.
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Their vision was purely egalitarian, opposing different treatment even
where it benefited women. Their immediate goal was seemingly modest:
to gain for each woman equal access, independence, and autonomy
based in an individualistic liberal ethos, although the ultimate effect of
their project could have more radically transformed society. 48 They
fought to break down barriers of all sorts. One of their primary goals
was education, where they struggled to make schools gender-neutral in
their inputs-in admissions, resources, expectations, climate, and
curriculum-and thus in their outputs.
A key player in the development of what is generally known as
"liberal feminism" was Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who would ultimately
speak for a majority of the justices in United States v. Virginia. As
founding director, in the early 1970s, of the ACLU Women's Rights
Project (WRP) (the same organization that later joined in the case
against the Citadel), she carefully planned a litigation program that chal-
lenged sex stereotypes in a variety of contexts. To her mind, gender
distinctions, even when designed to benefit women, merely reinforced
outdated stereotypical notions that failed to recognize individual ability
and often resulted in unequal opportunities. 9 From 1971 to 1976, she
and her colleagues at the WRP tenaciously and incrementally whittled
away at the "separate spheres" doctrine. Using "equal treatment" as their
overarching guide, through a well-planned litigation agenda they suc-
cessfully moved the Supreme Court to examine more carefully
distinctions based on sex."
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Virginia, two decades later, became
the long-overdue capstone of those efforts. As one commentator later
captured it, "This is the opinion she had hoped the [C]ourt would one
day arrive at when she first started arguing cases of discrimination in the
1960s."5 The language, reasoning, and spirit drew heavily from a brief
she had prepared in an early unsuccessful round of litigation challenging
48. BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 809 (2d ed. 2000).
49. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. Rav. 1 (1975).
50. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating a state statute prohibiting the
sale of 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of twenty-one and to females under
the age of eighteen); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating a
federal law affording male members of the armed forces an automatic dependency al-
lowance for their wives but requiring servicewomen to prove that their husbands were
dependent); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down a law granting a pref-
erence for men over women in the appointment of administrators of estates).
51. Robert Marquand, Court Bolsters Protections for Women in Virginia Case, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, June 27, 1996, at 1 (quoting Mark Tushnet, former dean,
Georgetown University Law School).
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Philadelphia's all-male Central High School in federal court. 2 As she
later recalled, "[I]t was [like] winning [that] case twenty years later.""
B. Difference Feminism
As the 1970s drew to a close, the notion of gender equality as equal
treatment came under increasing attack within the feminist community.
Critics argued that liberal feminism could not account for real differ-
ences between the sexes and, particularly, for biological reproductive
differences that demanded different or special treatment for women.
More fundamentally, they noted the assimilationist approach to sex
equality failed to challenge the unequal paradigm of male normativity.
The standard itself was "gendered," relegating women to what Simone
de Beauvoir called "the incidental, the inessential ... the Other." 54 A
new wave of scholarship across the disciplines began to view sex differ-
ences through a different lens. Here the discussion turned to the
different experiences of women and men, which have resulted in a dif-
ferent moral and psychological perspective. Women gain definition
through relationships, we were told, and women's distinct "ways of
knowing" became celebrated.
Few would dispute that the one defining work energizing the de-
bate over sameness and difference, and bringing it to the consciousness
of an international community, was Carol Gilligan's groundbreaking
book In a Different Voice." Translated into nine languages, the book
apparently resonated for women across nations and cultures. Yet it also
touched off a firestorm of negative reaction, especially among some, but
certainly not all, feminists. And although it was essentially a study of
moral development, it set the stage for subsequent scholarship on gender
differences that has had profound effects on educational policy. Ulti-
mately, but unintentionally, it gave credence to arguments in favor of
same-sex schooling.
52. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court for the Third Circuit,
Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
53. PHILIPPA STRUM, WOMEN IN THE BARRACKS: THE VMI CASE AND EQUAL RIGHTS
285 (2002).
54. SIMONE DE BEAtUvOIR, THE SECOND SEx at xix (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Vintage
Books 1989) (1949).
55. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
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Drawing on the work of "relational" psychologists from the
1970s,56 Gilligan disputed the conventional wisdom on the disparity
between women's experience and the representation of human devel-
opment. She challenged prevailing psychological theories that judged
women on how closely they conformed to a male norm. She asserted
that women and men have different moral orientations that should be
valued equally. She contended that women, or what is culturally defined
as "female," are oriented toward attachment, connectedness, and caring,
which inclines them toward human relationships. Men, or what is cul-
turally defined as "male," are oriented toward separateness and abstract
thinking, which predisposes them toward individual achievement and
the subordination of relationships. Gilligan claimed that the "different
voice" she described is neither "absolute," nor a generalization on either
sex, but merely represents contrasting "modes of thought." Yet she esti-
mated that, while the "care focus" is not characteristic of all women, it is
almost exclusively a "female phenomenon," at least among the educated
North Americans that she had studied.57
Some feminist scholars welcomed the high moral status this argu-
ment suggested for women, freeing them from the male norm and
valuing their unique qualities. They connected Gilligan's theory with
the work of other contemporary psychologists, who argued that
women's different life experiences, combined with academic learning,
produced different forms of knowledge or ways of knowing as compared
with men.58 A core of scholars within the legal academy soon coalesced
around the difference principle to redefine gender equality. Setting aside
the formal equality or equal treatment of the 1970s, they posited a con-
ception of substantive equality based in different treatment and equal
results. Instead of women accommodating to the male norm, they ar-
gued that social institutions had to change to accommodate women's
lives5 9
56. See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978); JEAN BAKER
MILLER, TowarD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (1976); ADRIENNE RICH, OF
WOMAN BORN (1977).
57. Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientation and Moral Development, in WOMEN AND MORAL
THEORY 25 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987).
58. See MARY FIELD BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS or KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SELF, VoicE, AND MIND (1986).
59. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Changing the Values in Tort Law, 25 TULSA L.J. 759 (1990);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 39
(1985); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Chil-
dren's Rights, 9 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1986); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the
Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
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Gilligan's book created a theoretical base for her later research on
adolescent girls. And it is here that her work made a definitive mark on
educational policy and practice. From interviews with female students in
several private, independent schools, Gilligan concluded that adolescence
is "a watershed in female development, a time when girls are in danger of
drowning or disappearing."60 She compared early adolescence in women's
development to early childhood for men. For her, both are a time of
"compromise between voice and relationship." As she saw it, that
compromise for girls is tied to women's subordinate role in society. 6 Her
observations and conclusions gave theoretical credence to the empirical
findings of educational researchers and women's advocates examining
gender equity over the following decade. 62 Those findings ultimately
found their way into policy arguments supporting single-sex schooling.
Gilligan's work held personal meaning for many women of her
generation. Yet there were many others who saw danger lurking in the
difference principle. Scholars from across the disciplines railed against
the implicit gender stereotypes, which, to them, dangerously reclaimed
Victorian gender ideology. By ascribing certain common traits to all
women, the difference strategy could have the unintended effect of not
only perpetuating such stereotypes in the larger society, but also
embedding those traits within women themselves. And by failing to
address the cultural, political, and social forces-including race and
class-that intersect with gender in the lives of women, difference
feminism suggested that gender differences were natural, immutable,
and traceable to a feminine essence or "innate womanhood."63 Gilligan's
theory and the scholarly movement it spawned clearly laid bare the
60. Carol Gilligan, Preface, Teaching Shakespeare's Sister: Notes from the Underground of
Female Adolescence, in MAKING CONNECTIONS: THE RELATIONAL WORLDS OF ADO-
LESCENT GIRLS AT EMMA WILLARD SCHOOL 10 (Carol Gilligan, et al. eds., 1990).
61. LYNN MIKEL BROWN & CAROL GILLIGAN, MEETING AT THE CROSSROADS: WOMEN'S
PSYCHOLOGY AND GIRLS' DEVELOPMENT 218 (1992).
62. See, e.g., AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, SHORTCHANGING GIRLS,
SHORTCHANGING AMERICA (1991); JUDY MANN, GROWING Up FEMALE IN AMERICA
(1994); PEGGY ORENSTEIN, SCHOOL GIRLS: YOUNG WOMEN, SELF-ESTEEM, AND THE
CONFIDENCE GAP (1994); MARY PIPHER, REVIVING OPHELIA: SAVING THE SELVES OF
ADOLESCENT GIRLS (1994); SADKER & SADCER, supra note 38.
63. See generally, DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW (1989); Mary Jo Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim
"A Different Voice"? 15 HA.v. WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 48 (1992); Linda Nicholson,
Women, Morality, and History, 50 Soc. REs. 514, 530-33 (1983); James C. Walker,
In A Different Voice: Cryptoseparatist Analysis of Female Moral Development, 50 Soc.
REs. 665, 690-94 (1983); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 797, 807 (1989).
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"dilemma of difference:" whether we recognize differences or ignore
them; either way, they carry a stigma.6'
C. Dominance Theory
As the 1980s progressed, difference feminism became mired in its
many implicit perils. Meanwhile, a third, less popularly embraced strand
of feminist thought began to challenge the underlying premises of
liberal feminism and difference feminism and, in doing so, shifted the
focus from the moral to the political. For this diverse group of mainly
legal scholars, the key to women's inequality is not difference but
dominance. Simply put, women are unequal to men because they lack
power.65 In their view, the debate over whether or not differences are
"natural" is inconsequential. Any attempt to reconcile equality and
difference merely obscures the one difference that really counts: that
women are politically, socially, and economically subordinate to men.
Efforts to promote equality between the sexes, therefore, must
incorporate an understanding that women do not exist on an equal
66
footing with men. A critical question here is whether recognizing
differences (regardless of their origin) as a matter of law in a particular
case will more likely reduce or reinforce existing political, social, and
economic disparities. The issue is not difference per se, but rather "the
difference difference makes."
67
Again, within this discourse, the concept of power, suggested by
some and stridently invoked by others, plays an essential role. For
Catharine MacKinnon, the chief architect and most radical proponent
of this view, the equal treatment of liberal feminism legitimizes en-
trenched patriarchal values while failing to acknowledge the connection
between sex and power. At the same time, she also warns that celebrat-
ing women's difference from men is rife with hierarchical implications.
To her mind, difference feminism merely celebrates the terms of
women's oppression. She calls difference "inequality's post hoc excuse
. . its outcome presented as its origin," the "velvet glove on the iron fist
64. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 20 (1990).
65. Introduction, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 11 (Nancy E. Dowd & Michelle S. Jacobs
eds., 2003).
66. See Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE
L.J. 913, 965 (1983); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL.
L. REv. 1279, 1296 (1987); Isabel Marcus & Paul J. Speigelman, Feminine Discourse,
Moral Values, and the Law--A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 28 (1985).
67. RHODE, supra note 63, at 313 (1989).
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of domination." This is so, she says, whether differences are "affirmed"
or "denied," whether women are "punished" or "protected in their
name."6 8 As she sees it, Gilligan's "different voice" is the "voice of the
victim." Woman's voice, she argues, is not her own, but only what male
supremacy has made it out to be.
69
D. (In)essentialism
As advocates of these competing strains of feminism have sorted
through the "woman question," others have challenged the notion of a
unitary "women's experience" and questioned the implicit understand-
ing that feminist scholarship speaks for all women. Viewed by some as
presenting a subset of "third wave" feminism, these critics have under-
scored the multiple axes of domination under which some women have
suffered. 70 They argue that by addressing the abstract woman, feminist
scholars have disregarded critical factors such as race, ethnicity, age, re-
ligion, class, handicapping conditions, and sexual orientation, all of
which inevitably shape women's lives. Women and men experience
privilege and subordination in different ways depending on these char-
acteristics. In their view, feminist scholarship narrowly reflects the values
and concerns of white, middle- and upper-middle-class, heterosexual,
college-educated women, thus constructing its own form of privilege.
They further hold that even when feminists have taken into account
various forms of identity and oppression differences, they have consid-
ered them as additive and distinct, and not interrelated and interactive.7'
68. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscouRSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 8 (1987).
69. Marcus & Speigelman, supra note 66, at 74-75; see generally, CATHARINE A.
MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
70. This is not to confuse these theorists with other critics of 'second wave" feminism to
whom the popular press has attached the "third wave" feminist label but whom many
academicians consider "conservative post-feminists" or even "anti-feminists." In-
cluded among these are Naomi Wolf, Katie Roiphe, Camille Paglia, and Christina
Hoff Sommcrs. See THIRD WAVE AGENDA: BEING FEMINIST, DOING FEMINISM (Les-
lie Heywood & Jennifer Drake eds., 1997).
71. See generally, ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Trina
Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master's House,
10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16 (1995); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First
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Women scholars of color, in particular, have condemned this per-
vasive inattention to the diversity of women's experiences. For them,
liberal feminism, difference feminism, and dominance theory all have
presented white womanhood and manhood as universal truths while
relegating racial issues to footnotes, if addressed at all. As the feminist
author bell hooks points out, liberal feminism was off the mark in set-
ting women's social equality with men as its goal and failing to
recognize that all men do not benefit equally from sexism. Meanwhile,
dominance and subordination take on a different cast among people of
color for whom racism, sexism, and classism often intersect.
African-American women, for example, have suffered subordina-
tion not only at the hands of men, but also from white female
employers, as in the context of domestic work, while African-American
men also have been victims of white oppression. The very fact that Afri-
can-American women and men have been tied in their struggle for
liberation has made African-American women disinclined to view men
as the enemy. Moreover, unlike white society, which has marginalized
women's contributions, African-American communities have long val-
ued the indispensable role that African-American women historically
have played in maintaining their social institutions, including churches
and communal organizations. 72 And unlike many white educated femi-
nists who view the family as a source of women's disempowerment, for
African-American women and other minorities, including Latinas and
Asian-Americans (as well as working class whites), the family can be a
"haven in a harsh and unyielding world."
73
African-American women typically and understandably project an
image of independence, autonomy, resourcefulness, and self-reliance. As
teenagers, they fare better on tests of self-confidence and self-esteem
than white or Latina females.74 Yet in the end, these traits are not
sufficiently strong to overcome countervailing social and economic
forces that derail their life plans. The disconnect between appearances
and reality, and its underlying causes, often go unnoticed in the
conventional educational setting.
This debate over gender essentialism has served to underscore the
paradox at the core of feminism. As Elizabeth Spelman has noted, "Any
attempt to talk about all women in terms of something we have in
Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTs. L.
REP. 297 (1992).
72. HOOKS, supra note 48, at 68-69.
73. Joan Williams, Implementing Antiessentialism: How Gender Wars Turn into Race and
Class Conflict, in FEMINIST LEcAL THEORY, supra note 65, at 101, 107.
74. AMERicAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, supra note 62, at 9.
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common undermines attempts to talk about differences among us, and
vice versa."75 Others, including Catharine MacKinnon, have argued
more definitively that antiessentialism is harmful to women.76 In the
interests of political pragmatism, they maintain, the success and even
the possibility of a coherent argument supporting women's position in
society requires a singleness of voice and purpose. 77 Still others, like
Mari Matsuda, see something positive emerging from the position of
intersectionality, where comparing struggles and challenges can serve as
a means of coalition building against all forms of subordination. 8
E. The Value ofDistinctions
As we parse these diverse feminist orientations, we should not over-
look the unique contributions that each has made to advance discourse
on gender equality and promote the status of women. At the beginning
of the modern-day women's movement, liberal feminism scored an im-
pressive record in raising women's expectations. By articulating their
concerns in the language of equal treatment, advocates presented a fa-
miliar standard that appealed to fundamental notions of fairness and
justice. At the same time, difference feminism has presented a vantage
point for recognizing those personal and interpersonal attributes,
whether of biological or social origin, that are more prevalent among
women. Dominance theory, while too radical and overstated to appeal
to a broad section of the female population, still reminds us that we
cannot honestly discuss equality without also considering the disparities
in economic, political, and social power between women and men.
Meanwhile, (in)essentialism underscores certain nuances that bear di-
rectly on the question of sex equality across a broad population of
women and men. In doing so, it challenges the myth of the essential
woman and brings to light how the intersection of multiple identity
characteristics shapes our life experiences.
At the same time, however, as we examine these conflicting theo-
ries, we also come to understand how the divisions among women's
advocates on the question of single-sex schooling reflect deep conflicts
over the meaning of gender equality and how to achieve it. The obvious
75. SPELmAN, supra note 71, at 3.
76. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1291-97 (1991).
77. Id.
78. Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, in
FEMINIST LECAL THEORY, supra note 65, at 75.
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tension among these perspectives inevitably reveals itself in both policy
initiatives and court decisions, and especially in the efforts of public
school districts to implement programs within constitutional limits. As
opponents, particularly organized women's groups, remain ideologically
transfixed in equality as sameness, proponents pragmatically weave
through a maze of sex differences and inequalities based on race and
social class, while struggling to avoid the dangerous pitfalls of deficiency,
essentialism, and categorical stereotypes. Meanwhile, each group draws
on women's historical subordination to shape a distinct remedy, either
in same or different treatment. At the extremes, neither side sees much
merit to the other's arguments.
In the end, what we can glean from this overview and analysis, is
that education in general, and single-sex schooling in particular, need
not, and should not, be wedded to any one comprehensive theory or
perspective. That, in fact, was the path that Justice Ginsburg thought-
fully and effectively forged in her opinion striking down the all-male
admissions policy at the Virginia Military Institute.
III. THE VIRGINm ROADMAP
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in United States v. Virginia" skillfully
weaves together strands of sameness, difference, and dominance theories
into a measured exposition on gender equality. Although the opinion is
firmly anchored in sameness, it presents carefully articulated and cir-
cumscribed accommodations to difference, set against the historical
backdrop of subordination. It proceeds almost as a dialogue between the
first two, as point and counterpoint, advancing on difference and then
quickly qualifying it with equal treatment, while interjecting touches of
dominance theory as the "Greek chorus" in the background to maintain
perspective.
Here we see her cautiously but deftly navigating a winding course
between competing visions of absolute equality, on the one hand, and
the recognition that women should be compensated for socially imposed
disabilities, or accommodated for different educational needs, on the
other. Although she uses what men have as the norm and looks for
equal treatment in this case, she acknowledges the inherent physical
differences between the sexes, thereby leaving open the door for
different treatment under other circumstances. At the same time, she
79. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
80. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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shows sensitivity to women's history of exclusion and subordination,
particularly in education.
She chooses her words more carefully than one might initially
comprehend. She recognizes the reality of "physical" differences (but
not all differences) between the sexes, but she also cautions against its
potentially harmful misapplication. She acknowledges, and not grudg-
ingly, that unlike race, for which the law recognizes no differences, the
"'inherent differences' between men and women" are "cause for celebra-
tion." 81 "Physical differences between men and women," she tells us,
"are enduring."82 "'The two sexes are not fungible.' ,83 That language
itself is indeed noteworthy from someone so strongly tied in the past to
the sameness ideal and who, in her early career as a litigator, so force-
fully argued for the Court to consider race and sex classifications with
equal skepticism.
But at the same time, she warns that those differences cannot be
used to "denigrat[e]" either men or women or to place "artificial con-
straints on an individual's opportunity."" "State actors controlling gates
to opportunity," she says, "may not exclude qualified individuals based
on 'fixed notions' concerning the roles and abilities of males and fe-
males."85 Decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis." The state of
Virginia was wrong in categorically excluding from a unique benefit
those women who had the ability and capacity to withstand VMI's rig-
orous training program merely because most women did not.87 Her
reference to the individual reflects her grounding in liberal feminism.
Beyond physical differences, she clearly avoids any assumptions about
the group characteristics or traits that difference feminism would
warmly embrace.
Justice Ginsburg tells us that sex classifications "are permissible" as
long as they "advance the full development of the talent and capacities
of our Nation's people.""8 But they cannot be used "as they once were to
create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
81. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
82. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
83. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193
(1946)).
84. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
85. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 725 (1982)).
86. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
87. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
88. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
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women."89 This broad language hints at single-sex schools for inner-city
minority students, including boys. Yet the closing qualification also sets
the outer limits and suggests a particular concern with the situation of
women and the potential for discrimination against them. The implica-
tion to be drawn is that sometimes "equal" might, of necessity, mean
"different."
In a tantalizing footnote, Justice Ginsburg explicitly notes that sin-
gle-sex programs may, in fact, be specifically intended to overcome
gender inequities-to "'dissipate, rather than perpetuate, traditional
gender classifications. '"' 9' That observation suggests that separate but
equal "might sometimes be permissible for sex" as in the case of all-girls'
public schools.9 This too seems to depart from a stand she took nearly
three decades ago in a government report advocating the integration of
all single-sex education-related institutions.92 But she also warns that
state actors cannot rely on "'overbroad generalizations'" that might
"perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination."" "[G]eneralizations
about the 'way women are,' estimates of what is appropriate for most
women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent
and capacity place them outside the average description."94 Again, al-
though the language here rejects the core element of difference
feminism, that there are some traits more prevalent within each sex,
even difference feminists would agree that the state cannot use differ-
ences to deny opportunities to those who fall outside the norm. The
problem was not that Virginia had recognized a difference between
women and men, but that it effectively had "turned that difference into
a disadvantage."95
The relevance of this discussion to elementary and secondary edu-
cation requires qualification. Here the Court was dismissing
generalizations about college-aged women and men who presumptively
exhibit no sex-based differences beyond the most obvious and irrelevant
89. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533-34 (citation omitted).
90. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7 (quoting Brief for Twenty-Six Private Women's Col-
leges as Amici Curiae 5).
91. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women's Equality, 56 THE REc. (OF
THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK) (Winter 2001), at 22, 27.
92. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SEx BiAs IN THE U.S. CODE (1977) (co-authored by
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Brenda Feigen-Fasteau), cited in Phyllis Schlafly, How the
Feminists Want to Change Our Lives, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 65, 69 (1994).
93. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542 (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139
n. 1l (1994)).
94. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550.
95. CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 165 (1999).
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biological traits. Girls and boys, on the other hand, are still in the proc-
ess of maturing and developing. Certain differences in aptitude or
ability may be real at different stages as they move from childhood
through adolescence and into adulthood. That being said, even where
certain generalizations may be appropriate, they still cannot be "over-
broad." The key questions to be answered are: first, what differences are
relevant to educational performance and success; and second, what em-
pirical evidence is needed to determine whether the differences relied
upon are based in fact, and therefore "real," or grounded in archaic
stereotypes? These questions are difficult to answer but nonetheless cru-
cial to the legitimacy of single-sex programs.
In deciding the case against VMI, the Court was operating against
the historical backdrop of not just this particular institution, but of male
schools in general. Those schools traditionally and categorically ex-
cluded females from a specific and highly valued opportunity that was
not available elsewhere to women. Justice Ginsburg recalls how, in the
past, legal and medical education similarly resisted placing women on an
equal footing with men.9 The severely restrictive social and economic
consequences that flowed from that exclusion denied women the ability
to participate as equal citizens. This argument holds strains of domi-
nance theory where, as Catharine MacKinnon has put it, the critical
concern is whether the policy or practice in question "integrally con-
tributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a deprived position
because of gender status.9 7 In the Court's view, that was precisely the
effect of VMI's exclusionary admissions policy, which consequently un-
dermined equality.
But dominance theory also suggests another side to the story. What
if the circumstances were different? Could the government classify
young people on the basis of sex in order to include rather than exclude,
that is, to offer rather than deny an opportunity to individuals, such as
women or racial minorities, who have suffered exclusion in the past?
The Court does not address that question. Yet the distinction would
support single-sex programs for girls and minority students of both
sexes.
Finally, Justice Ginsburg offers specific guidelines on what courts
should consider in judging whether the education offered both sexes is
"substantially equal." Drawing on Sweatt v. Painter,"i the case that de-
segregated the University of Texas School of Law back in 1950, she
96. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 543-44.
97. MAcKINNON, supra note 68, at 8.
98. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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counsels that equality must be measured by both tangible and intangible
factors, including curricular and extracurricular choices, the stature of
the faculty, funding, prestige, library resources, and alumni support and
influence."
IV. FINDING COMMON GROUND
Of course, the devil is always in the details. And the details on sin-
gle-sex schooling are indeed complex and still yet fully to be drawn. As
newly re-envisioned, this approach is still a "work in progress." But be-
fore considering the fine points, feminists must first move beyond
ideology and acknowledge what each brings to the table of educational
reform. Only by coming to terms with the fact that no one theory or
orientation provides a completely satisfactory justification or set of
guideposts will both sides fully appreciate that each has something sig-
nificant to offer.
Justice Ginsburg's careful reasoning in the Virginia decision dem-
onstrates how the various strands within feminist thinking can
constructively contribute to resolving some of the disagreements and
confusion among feminists as they position themselves in the debate
over single-sex schooling. Difference feminism allows for valuing attrib-
utes, whether inherent or socialized, that may appear more common
among females than males. But at the same time, liberal feminism, ever
mindful of historical exclusion, tempers that recognition and defines its
outer bounds, warning against overbroad generalizations and the dan-
gers of promoting feelings of deficiency. As Deborah Rhode has noted,
"To ignore sexual differences is to ignore human experience; to roman-
ticize their value is to risk exaggeration."'00 Meanwhile, dominance
theory forces educators to look at the population served and to reflect
on whether the program is likely to remedy the harm that comes from a
position of subordination or second-class citizenship. In that sense, it
serves to justify single-sex programs for girls and for racial minority stu-
dents of both sexes.
Finally, the insights gained from (in)essentialist sensitivity to
multiple identities are especially important in addressing racial and
economic differences among students. The rich literature in this area
pushes educators to look beyond the sameness-difference dilemma and
consider ways to attend to the specific educational and social problems
confronting minority girls and boys in particular. Research on school
99. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 551-53.
100. RHODE, supra note 63, at 312.
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performance, in fact, appears to support this more nuanced view.
Findings suggest that the positive effects of single-sex schooling may fall
within a hierarchy of low-status characteristics (female, racial minority,
low-socio-economic status) with the greatest positive impact on African-
American females from low socio-economic homes, slightly diminished
impact among African-American and Latino males from low
socio-economic homes, smaller effects still for white middle-class
females, and virtually no differences among white males or affluent
students regardless of race or sex. TM These tentative but promising
results beg for further validation.
That being said, the moment has come for women's advocates on
both sides of the single-sex schooling divide, whether avowedly feminist
or not, to see the bigger picture and reassess their arguments. As critics
must tone down their rhetoric and open their minds to new findings on
sex-linked developmental and learning differences among children and
adolescents, so too must the proponents of same-sex programs recognize
the fears expressed on the other side, and acknowledge the potential, but
not unavoidable, dangers of sex separation. Above all, opponents must
accept that this is not a "winner takes all" battle. Nor is it a referendum
on the success or failure of the feminist project. Separating students by
sex on a voluntary basis, whether to remove social distractions, to en-
hance self-confidence, or to accommodate short-term developmental
differences, need not be a surrender to the reactionary forces of separate
spheres ideology, so long as programs are thoughtfully designed and
administrators and teachers are adequately informed and sensitized to
the issues.
This last point is especially crucial. At its best, single-sex education
can be an effective tool of empowerment and self-realization for some
girls and boys. The widely-recognized success of the Young Women's
Leadership School in New York over the past eight years is a clear
example: daily attendance above 95 percent, a 98 percent graduation
rate as compared to 60 percent citywide, and a 100 percent four-year
college acceptance rate in all four graduating classes. 10 2 Feminists should
rejoice in the profound difference the school has made in the lives of its
students.
But then again, at its worst, and as history has proven, single-sex
schooling can unwittingly become a tool of gender polarization and
oppression, perpetuating stereotypical images that produce feelings of
101. Riordan, supra note 28, at 177.
102. The Young Women's Leadership Foundation, The Young Women's Leadership School
ofEasr Harlem, at http://ywl/foundation.org/networLschooLharl.html.
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inadequacy among girls while reinforcing exclusionary and sexist
attitudes among boys. A three-year report on a misguided, unfocused,
and poorly planned dual academy program in the state of California in
the late 1990s gives proof to this contention. In schools serving at-risk
girls and boys separately, but within the same facility, researchers found
that teachers were subjecting students to harmful comparisons and sex-
stereotyping, including gender-specific teaching and disciplinary
methods.' It goes without saying that strategies and materials appealing
to different learning styles and interests, while not harmful in
themselves, must be used with thought and careful attention when those
differences are ascribed to sex. If not, they merely serve to reinforce, and
even imbed, differences where they may not exist, preventing members
of either sex from moving beyond predetermined limits, whether
biological or cultural. This complexity in constructing definitions of
femininity and masculinity and the way such constructions reflect the
values and beliefs of the surrounding community and the larger society
go to the heart of all education but especially single-sex schooling.
In view of these potentially positive and negative realities, it would
be a missed opportunity if women's advocates across the feminist spec-
trum failed to work constructively with emerging programs from the
ground up. Rather than playing a game of "gotcha" after the fact, they
should help educators become consciously aware of how to navigate the
tricky divide between gender stereotyping and gender equity. It further
would prove eye-opening indeed for them to enter the world of private
single-sex schooling, which generally has undergone important changes
in climate, curriculum, and staffing in recent decades, due in no small
measure to the women's movement. The teaching and administrative
staff of these schools are more likely to include both women and men,
while girls' schools have become more consciously empowering and
boys' schools more nurturing and supportive of gender equity. Without
denying the significant racial and socioeconomic differences between
private and public schools, there is much to be learned from these ex-
periences. By seeing what is offered to the most privileged, critics and
skeptics can better comprehend and envision how single-sex schooling
might effectively address some of the resistant problems facing disadvan-
taged students who have become the main focus of public school
initiatives.
103. AMANDA DATNOW ET AL., IS SINGLE GENDER SCHOOLING VIABLE IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS?: LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA'S PILOT PROGRAM (2001).
104. See Katherine Clarricoates, The Importance of Being Earnest... Emma ... Tom ...
Jane: The Perception and Categorization of Gender Conformity and Gender Deviation in
Primary Schools, in SCHOOLING FOR WOMEN'S WORK, supra note 28, at 26-27.
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The time is ripe for feminists to initiate a meaningful dialogue
amongst themselves and with others, and particularly with educators, to
help establish realistic and socially relevant goals for these programs,
explore meaningful measures of short- and long-term success beyond
achievement test data (e.g., reduced pregnancy, suspension and dropout
rates, and increased enrollment in nontraditional courses), and infuse
institutional values and practices with core feminist understandings of
gender equality. The Court's reasoning in United States v. Virginia is a
good place to start in shaping these discussions.
CONCLUSION
As single-sex schooling continues to expand while awaiting legal af-
firmation, and as we move from the "whether" to the "how," educators
nationwide need guidance in giving form and substance to this old idea
turned new. Feminists, armed with their unique perspectives, can here
play a significant role, not as shrill uncompromising critics, nor simply
as vigilant watchdogs, nor even as distantly supportive cheering squads,
but rather as reasoned voices, in discussion and not debate, construc-
tively helping educators determine how best to provide an appropriate
education for girls and boys, based not on group stereotypes, but on
informed understandings of individual needs as they sometimes coalesce
around gender. But before that can happen, feminists must agree to
leave their differences behind on the ideological battlefield and move to
a common ground of shared purposes. t

